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Abstract - Smart cities are growing significantly due to the 
growth of smart connected vehicles and Internet of Things 
(IoT) where a wide range of devices are connected to share 
data. Online mapping is one of the fundamental services 
offered in smart cities which enables the vehicle owners to 
find shortest or fastest direction toward a destination thus 
reduces travel cost and air pollution. However, existing 
online mapping services rely on centralized servers, e.g., 
Google, which collect data from users to offer service. This 
method is unlikely to scale with growth in the smart city 
participants and introduces privacy concerns and data 
wall where data of the users is managed by big companies. 
To address these challenges, in this paper we introduce 
DMap, a blockchain-based platform where the users can 
share data in an anonymous distributed manner with 
service providers. To the best of our knowledge, DMap is 
the first distributed blockchain-based solution for online 
mapping. To improve the scalability of the blockchain, we 
propose to use edge-computing along with blockchain. To 
protect against malicious vehicles that may inject false 
data, we define a reputation system where the collected 
data of the vehicles is verified by monitoring the neighbor 
data. We introduce data marketplace where users can 
trade their data to address data wall challenge. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Edge Computing, Smart City, 
Data Marketplace 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the vehicles are getting connected to other 
vehicles and smart infrastructures in smart cities and generally 
to the Internet, thus become part of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). Smart vehicles are equipped with a wide range of 
devices and built-in sensors like cameras, radar sensors, and 
built-in GPS devices. The collected data by the smart vehicles 
is expected to reach 4TB per day [1] by 2020. On one hand, 
the data collected can be used by service providers to offer a 
wide range of personalized sophisticated services, e.g., online 
mapping service, congestion control, and locating parking 
spots. On the other hand, the service providers can build 
virtual profiles of the users’ activities and thus compromise 
their privacy. The SPs may also trade the data of the users 
without their consent which also comprises the user privacy.  
The accuracy of the received services is critical for the smart 
vehicle owners. The services offered by the SPs rely on the 
collected data from the users, thus the SPs with more 
customers will provide more accurate services to their users 
which leads to attracting even more users. This lead to “data 
wall” challenge where the data of the smart vehicles is owned 
and managed by large companies. Smaller companies cannot 
compete with large companies due to lack of real-time data 
from users.  
Location-Based Services (LBS) are among the main services 
offered using the data collected by the smart vehicles due to 
the vehicle mobility. Using LBS the SPs monitor real-time 
location of the vehicles and offer personalizes services, 
including locating nearest parking spot and online mapping 
which eventually reduces the travel time and air pollution and 
cost. The city managers also benefit from LBS to control the 
traffic and congestion and plan for city management projects 
such as train route, new road, and traffic lights. Although SPs 
can utilize the location data to offer personalized services to 
the user, they can virtually build a profile of user activities and 
track the user location which in turn compromises the user 
privacy. 
As noted earlier, the services offer by SPs largely relies on 
accurate data which made data unprecedentedly important in 
smart cities. Many data-driven companies trade the data of 
their users which leads to the introduction of an ever-growing 
technology known as data market place. The data produced by 
the end-users or their associated devices is fed to the data 
market place, where the user can manage all his data and trade 
with SPs or other users in return for receiving incentives that 
is mainly monetary. It is critical that the users have control 
over their data and be able to audit any exchange of their data. 
The market place users need to trust to the data generator and 
devices do not generate false data, i.e., they need to trust that 
the received data is correct. However, existing market places 
generally assume that the devices are secure and thus generate 
trusted data, while this might not always be correct. Thus, data 
market place demands a method to achieve trust to the data it-
self.  
In recent years, blockchain has attracted a significant attention 
from both academia and practitioners as a means to provide 
decentralization, anonymity, and security. Blockchain is an 
immutable timestamp ledger of blocks that is used for storing 
data. The participating nodes in blockchain use transactions to 
communicate which are cryptographically signed. All 
transactions are broadcast to the network and verified by all 
participating nodes without relying on a central authority or 
broker. Particular nodes in the network, known as miners or 
verifiers, collect transactions in form of blocks and append in 
the blockchain. The latter involves following a consensus 
algorithm which ensures blockchain security against malicious 
miners that try to store invalid transactions in the blockchain. 
As shown in Figure 1, each block maintains the hash of the 
previous block which ensures blockchain immutability. 
Changing the content of a block changes the corresponding 
hash in the subsequent blocks which will reveal the attack. 
Blockchain users use changeable keys to protect their identity 
which introduces high level of anonymity. 
The main contribution of this paper is to present DMap, a 
distributed blockchain-based solution for online mapping 
which to the best of our knowledge is the first work in this 
area. DMap uses a public blockchain where any node can join 
the blockchain and generate transactions. The participating 
nodes, that can be smart vehicles, Road Side Infrastructures 
(RSI), and city managers, are known by a changeable PK 
which introduces anonymity. To increase scalability, only the 
high-resource available participants, e.g., RSIs, and city 
managers manage the blockchain by generating blocks and 
verifying transactions. The smart vehicle owners can trade the 
data of their vehicles using blockchain with other participants 
in a distributed and anonymous manner. Recall that trust to the 
generated data by the devices is challenging in existing market 
places. To address this challenge, we propose to employ edge-
computing, where RSI collects data of smart vehicles and 
validates the data as the edge of the network. To validate data 
the RSI examines the received data from each vehicle with the 
data received by other vehicles in the same region. If the RSI 
detects inconsistency between the data produced by one 
vehicle compared to other surrounding vehicles, it marks the 
data as untrusted and discards the transaction. The RSI then 
signs the transactions and broadcast to the blockchain.  It is 
assumed that each RSI uses a predefined key which is certified 
by a Certificate Authority (CA) and these keys are known to 
all blockchain miners used for verifying the data. By 
employing edge-computing DMap increases scalability and 
reduces processing overhead in blockchain to ensure trust in 
data sources. We also used cloud service as automotive data 
market place to store verified data. 
DMap enables blockchain participants to request the traffic 
data in a particular region that can be used either for city 
planning or online mapping. For this, the participants send 
their request to a "rule table" which is essentially an API in the 
cloud storage that connects the cloud to the blockchain similar 
to wallet softwares in conventional blockchains. The data of 
the smart vehicles is classified based on the location of the 
corresponding RSI. To conduct the trading, DMap employs 
smart contract which determines how long the user is allowed 
to use the data and to which data the user is permitted to 
access.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section II we 
describe related work. Details of DMap are discussed in 
Section III. Section IV describes data trade process using 
DMap.  The security of DMap is analyzed in Section V and 
finally, in section VI we conclude the paper. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
II.RELATED WORK 
Blockchain applications in smart connected vehicles and smart 
cities have received a tremendous attention in recent years. In 
this section, we propose a literature review of the relevant 
works to DMap.  
Authors in [7] proposed a blockchain-based framework known 
as speedychain which is adopted for smart city scenarios. This 
framework uses permissioned blockchain to allow smart 
vehicles transmit data in a private and scalable manner while 
using a two-level trust model in which vehicles can trust RSIs 
and vice versa. The proposed method reduces latency in 
transferring data by storing transactions corresponding to each 
RSI in separate blocks.  
Authors in [6] presented a blockchain-based solution for 
automotive platform to overcome many traditional vehicular 
challenges including privacy preservation of the user while 
guaranteeing the security of the vehicle. In this approach each 
vehicle is equipped with an in-vehicle storage which is 
responsible for gathering privacy sensitive data which also 
prevents privacy leakage. This architecture also provides 
automotive services update without the interference of a 
central authority.  
 
Figure 1. The structure of the Blockchain 
 
Authors in [8] set up a blockchain-based solution to reduce 
the self-driving vehicle accident casualties with the capability 
to verify and store the accident scenarios where cell-based 
vehicular network oversees accident data of other vehicles. 
They presented a new proof of event mechanism to ensure the 
accuracy of the car accident data and its trustworthiness which 
are recorded in to the block of transactions. In the proposed 
architecture vehicles that were directly involved in the 
accident scene generate an accident transaction through 
vehicular network. They also presented a dynamic federation 
consensus model to verify the block of events. 
Authors in [9] have adopted the combination of vehicular 
communication technology and cloud computing together with 
blockchain technology to deploy an intelligent data sharing 
platform. Their architecture aimed to provide the privacy of 
Intelligent Vehicle. This architecture presents seven-layer 
vehicle communication framework while meeting the 
increasingly strict security requirements needs. 
III- D-Map: A Distributed solution to online 
mapping 
This section describes the details of the proposed architecture. 
Participating nodes in the network are smart vehicle, city 
manager, service providers (SPs), and Road Side 
Infrastructures (RSIs) which join a public blockchain. To 
improve scalability and reduce the overhead in smart vehicles, 
the blockchain is managed by high resource available devices 
including RSI, SPs, and city managers. The smart vehicles 
connect to the RSI in their region to receive service from the 
blockchain. Note that the smart vehicles are mobile entities 
and thus will need to change their associated RSI as they 
move. We assume soft hand over methods as in [6] are in 
place to manage the vehicle movement between RSIs.   
The smart vehicles share their location data with RSIs. 
Communication between RSI and the vehicles occur through 
transaction. RSIs are registered entities in a Certificate 
Authority (CA) and thus their key is known to all blockchain 
network. We assume that RSIs are trusted entities. A vehicle is 
a mobile node which is identified by a PK1. Every vehicle will 
interact with a RSI which is located in its close proximity. 
Every RSI collects information from vehicles in its 
neighborhood and will prove the transaction during 
verification process. Thereafter, RSI will send the transaction 
to the blockchain with its own certificate which essentially is 
the RSI signature, so that miners can verify that transaction 
                                                          
1 Public key 
has not tempered with.  The valid transactions are then mined 
in the blockchain. 
Smart vehicles produce a huge volume of data which contains 
privacy-sensitive information about the vehicle owner. Thus, it 
is critical for the vehicle owners to be able to control which 
data of the vehicle to share with requesters.  Mapping services 
utilize the location data of the vehicle, and thus should not be 
able to use other data of the vehicle. We assume that 
mechanism such as the one used in [4] would be effective, 
thereby the driver can manage data sharing and decides on 
what type of data to share. 
All transactions contain the signature of data generator, i.e., 
the smart vehicle, and data validator which is RSI. Based on 
the number of signatures in transactions, they are divided into 
two categories:  
 Single signature: this type of transaction requires only 
one signature to be considered as a valid transaction.  
 Multisign2: this type of transaction requires m out of 
n nodes to sign the transactions to be considered as a 
valid transaction in blockchain. 
 
Each vehicle populates a single signature transaction (1) that 
contains its geographical location data and communicates with 
nearest RSI nodes through any short-range communication 
technology e.g. Wi-Fi. The vehicle uses a fresh PK to generate 
new transactions and also ensures annoniminity. This prevents 
malicious nodes to track the vehicle location, which in turn 
compromises the privacy of the vehicle owner. The structure 
of the transaction sent by the vehicle to the RSI is as below: 
 
 
Where “loc” is the location where an event has occurred or the 
data has been collected, “event” is the type of situation that 
occurred on the road e.g. road damage or parking spots . 
“timestamp” is the information which identifies when a 
certain event has occurred. Finally, the vehicle populates its 
PK and the corresponding signature in the last two fields.  
The vehicles send the transactions to their associated RSI. The 
RSI needs to verify that the generated data is accurate and 
trusted. The RSIs employ neighbor monitoring methods such 
as in [10] for this aim. When RSI receives data from a vehicle, 
it must wait to receive data from other vehicles. If the data 
received from a vehicle is aligned with the data received from 
other vehicles, the RSI can trust to the data and sign the 
transactions as valid. Otherwise the transaction will be 
considered as invalid and is discarded. Note that as the 
vehicles are in close proximity, it is expected that the data 
from the vehicles have overlap and thus can be used to verify 
                                                          
2 Multi-signature 
(1) 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = [𝑙𝑜𝑐||𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡||𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝||𝑃𝐾||𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛] 
 
the data of other vehicles. In case the vehicles are not in close 
proximity, the RSI will set a flag in transaction indicating that 
the data might not be trusted. If the RSI set the flag value as 1 
meaning that the transaction is trustworthy, otherwise it should 
be rejected by the blockchain members.  
Once the RSI verified all received transactions, it generates a 
transaction which is structured as below:  
 
 
 
The “RSIsign” is an identifier for the RSI while Tdata is the data 
of sent by the vehicles. And the next two fields are vehicles 
signature and the corresponding PK respectively. Using this 
transaction, the participating nodes in the blockchain, can 
ensure that the data is trusted and verified by the RSI. It is 
noteworthy that since the data obtained from several vehicles 
may be similar and accurate, RSI will send only one copy of 
the data along with the signatures of the data producers in the 
multisign transaction shown above. The last field is the flag 
which is set by the RSI which identifies the data 
trustworthiness (as explained earlier). 
 
 In case that the verification is completely proved by the RSI 
the multisign transaction is broadcast to blockchain. It is 
noteworthy that in DMap all multisign transactions generated 
by each RSI are organized in a separate ledger which 
potentially protects against Sybil attack where a node floods 
the network with fake transactions.  
 
IV. BLOCKCHAIN SMART CONTRACT 
In DMap, the exchange of the data can be triggered by either 
the smart vehicle owner or a SP. The smart vehicle owners can 
share their data with other users, including online map SPs, 
e.g., Google, using smart contracts. They can share the real-
time or previously stored data for a particular time-frame 
requested by the SP. To do so, the vehicle owner stores a 
smart contract in blockchain that contains the PK of the SP, 
and the timespan in which the SP is allowed to access the data. 
SPs can request the data of all vehicles in a particular area. 
This in particular enables the SP to collect necessary 
information for online mapping service. To do so, the SP 
sends a data request transaction to all participants connected to 
a particular RSI or group of RSIs. The data request transaction 
contains the geographic coordinates of the requested area and 
the period of time in which the SP needs to access the data. 
When a RSI is certified by the CA, a dedicated storage space 
is created for the RSI in the cloud storage that is referred to as 
“data directory”. The cloud storage is employed to store the 
data while data access control is managed through the 
blockchain. The data directory facilitates retrieving data as the 
data is technically grouped based on the location. 
As shown in figure 2, the cloud storage is connected to the 
blockchain through a “rule table” API which facilitates the 
store and retrieve actions by the blockchain participants. As 
discussed earlier the rule table is placed in to the cloud 
storage. Recall from Section III that vehicles broadcast their 
single-signature transactions to Blockchain (step1 in figure 4). 
To store data in the cloud, the RSI unicasts data to the cloud 
along with the corresponding transaction (step 2 in figure 4). 
The rule table fetches the RSI key in the transaction and stores 
the data in the dedicated storage space to that particular RSI 
(step4 in figure 4). To retrieve data, the rule table first ensures 
that the blockchain participant that requests data has 
permission to access the data (as discussed later in this 
section) (step6 in figure 4). The data requester generates an 
access transaction, which is a multisign transaction and 
contains either the address of a smart contract where the data 
owner grants permission to access the data, or the signature of 
the data owner (step 5 in figure 4). The requester and the data 
owner must agree on the price of the data beforehand. If 
requester has permission to access the data, the rule table signs 
the corresponding access transaction and directly sends the 
data to the requester (step 7 and 8 in figure 4). Note that the 
rule table retrieves data based on the location of the data and 
its corresponding RSI. The signed access transaction is then 
stored in the blockchain (step 9 in figure 4). The rule table 
enables the blockchain participants to explore availability of 
particular data and volume of available data. Detail of the 
proposed architecture is outlined in figure 3. To reduce the 
associated overheads for retrieving data, DMap employs 
Elastic search [11] which enables marketplace to be able to 
support any standardized JSON format for location data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼 = [𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛||𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎||𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ||𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑘 ||𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔 ] 
 
(2) 
 
Figure 2. An identical view to find location data 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we analyze the privacy and security of the 
proposed architecture. 
Privacy: In DMap, each smart vehicle employs a changeable 
PK as its identity which in turn introduces high-level of 
anonymity. There is no link between the PK of the vehicle and 
the real-identity of the user. In DMap the users have full 
control on their data and are able to audit the accesses to their 
data. 
The malicious nodes may attempt to deanonymize a user by 
linking multiple identities to a single user which is known as 
linking attack in literature. In DMap, each transaction is 
generated using a fresh PK which prevents this attack. The 
trust to the data generated by the vehicles is later achieved 
using neighbor monitoring.  
In order to protect the RSIs safe against malicious vehicles 
that may produces false data, they start neighbor monitoring 
meaning that, each time it compares the transactions 
transmitted by each vehicle with the transactions of other 
vehicles a vehicle whose data varies by data from other 
vehicles is known as a malicious node and its data is rejected 
by the RSI. 
Security: The security of DMap is inherited from the security 
of blockchain where all transactions are encrypted and signed 
by the transaction generator. The data of the vehicle is stored 
in a cloud storage, where the data owner manages the access 
control using blockchain. All interactions by participants are 
recorded in the blockchain which introduces high auditability 
and transparency. Thus, the vehicle owner can detect any 
unauthorized access to his data.  
A malicious vehicle may try to falsify the network or impact 
online mapping services by injecting fake data. To prevent this 
attack, in DMap the RSIs conduce neighbor monitoring. In 
this method, the RSI compares the data collected by all RSIs 
and trust the most common data as the valid data. Thus, the 
fake data injected by a malicious node can be detected. 
However, if the number of malicious nodes in an area exceeds 
the number of honest nodes, the data might be affected, and 
the malicious nodes may be able to inject fake data. Note that 
given the large number of smart connected vehicles in an area, 
it is hard for the attacker to compromise the majority of the 
vehicles.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Smart vehicles generate significant volume of valuable data 
that can be used by the smart vehicle service providers to offer 
 
Figure 4. The process of intractions between entities  
 
 
Figure 3. Details of the proposed architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Details of then proposed architecture 
personalized services. In this paper, we proposed DMap, a 
decentralized blockchain-based framework that enables the 
vehicle owners to monetarize the data generated by their 
vehicle. DMap enables location-based service providers to 
purchase data from the users in real-time. DMap uses edge 
computing to enhance the scalability and reduce the 
processing overhead on participating nodes. To protect against 
malicious vehicles that inject fake data, the RSI validates data 
received by the vehicles by employing neighbor monitoring 
methods.  
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